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Abstract— In this paper, we suggest a framework for 
security and dependability metrics that is based on a number 
of non-functional system attributes. The attributes are the 
traditional security attributes (the “CIA”) and a set of 
dependability attributes. Based on a system model, we group 
those attributes into protective attributes and behavioural 
attributes and propose that metrication should be done in 
accordance. We also discuss the dependence between these two 
sets of attributes and how it affects the corresponding metrics.  
The metrics themselves are only defined to a limited degree. 
The concepts of security and dependability largely reflect the 
same basic system meta-property and are partly overlapping. 
We claim that the suggested approach will facilitate making 
quantitative assessment of the integrated concept of security 
and dependability as reflected by those attributes.  
  
Keywords - security and dependability metrics; security and 
dependability modelling; protective metrics; behavioural metrics 
I. INTRODUCTION 
There exists a large number of suggestions for how to 
measure (or metricate) security, with different goals and 
objectives. The application areas range from business 
management and organizational systems to large software 
systems. The approaches may be theoretical, technical, 
administrative or practical. In many cases, the goal is to find 
a single overall metric of security. Given that security is a 
complex and multi-faceted property, we believe that there 
are fundamental problems to find such an overall metric. In 
this paper, we suggest a restricted view on security [29] as 
being only the integrity attribute of the dependability-
security concept. Thus, we start out from a conceptual 
system model that integrates security and dependability. 
Other approaches have been suggested, e.g., by emphasizing 
the uncertainty dimension [11] or using ontologies [25]. 
Further, an excellent overview and classification is given in 
[33]. Our model is an input-output model in the sense that it 
describes a system’s interaction with its environment via the 
system boundaries [15, 38]. The model identifies the main 
attributes of security and dependability. It clarifies the 
relation between malicious environmental influence on the 
input side and the service output to the users of the system. 
Based on the model we regroup the traditional security and 
dependability attributes into protective attributes and 
behavioural attributes. We argue that metrics for 
dependability and security attributes can be defined in 
accordance. Thus, protective attributes can be metricated by 
protective metrics and the behavioural attributes by 
behavioural metrics as originally proposed in a short paper 
[31]. Here, we extend and detail this original proposal. Also, 
we apply a metrication process perspective and discuss the 
system-related dependencies between different types of 
metrics. This approach is different from existing approaches 
to clearly relate the metrics to system input and output 
attributes and to address the impact of latency aspects.  
In the following, Section II gives a brief summary of 
traditional security and dependability attributes. Section III 
describes the security model. The three defence lines in the 
model are described in Section IV as well as the causal 
relationship between the impairments in the system model. 
In Section V, security metrication according to the model is 
suggested. Section VI discusses the dependence between 
protective and behavioural metrics and Section VII briefly 
describes some benefits with our approach. Finally, we 
conclude the paper in Section VIII.   
II. TRADITIONAL DEFINITIONS OF SECURITY AND 
 DEPENDABILITY 
In this section, we briefly summarize the traditional 
security and dependability terminology. Security is normally 
decomposed into three different aspects: confidentiality, 
integrity and availability [8], loosely called “the CIA”. 
Confidentiality is the ability of the computing system to 
prevent disclosure of information to unauthorized parties. 
Integrity is the ability of the computer system to prevent 
unauthorized withholding, modification or deletion. 
Availability is the ability of the system to in fact deliver its 
service. More formally, it can be described as the 
probability that the system will be available, or ready for 
use, at a certain instant in time. Sometimes other 
characteristics are also suggested as security aspects, e.g., 
authentication and non-repudation, e.g., see [6, 9]. 
Dependability, on the other hand, is decomposed into the 
attributes: availability, reliability, safety, integrity and 
maintainability [2]. Here, reliability is a characteristic that 
reflects the probability that the system will deliver its 
service under specified conditions for a stated period of 
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time. Safety denotes the system’s ability to fail in such a 
way that catastrophic consequences are avoided. Thus, 
safety is reliability with respect to catastrophic failures. 
(Please note that there exist several other definitions of 
safety, e.g., in the software development area [2, 39].) 
Availability and integrity are defined as above. Finally, the 
maintainability attribute denotes the system’s ability to 
undergo modifications and repairs.  
It must be noted that the original dependability fault 
assumption was that of non-malicious, “stochastic” or 
“random” faults, such as those resulting from a component 
failure, rather than deliberate, malicious security faults 
(attacks). Such arbitrary faults might be internal faults, 
occurring (seemingly) spontaneously within the system, as 
well as external faults. Nowadays, both non-malicious and 
malicious faults are considered in existing models. 
However, because of the difficulty of making a formal or 
mathematical treatment of deliberate, malicious faults, most 
research so far has been done on dependability with a 
random fault assumption. 
 
III. A CONCEPTUAL SYSTEM MODEL 
A. Interaction between the system and the environment 
This section gives a brief description of the system 
model for security and dependability attributes originally 
proposed by Jonsson [15]. Once again, for simplicity, we 
use the term security to denote the combined concept of 
security and dependability.  
Our approach is that the security of a system should be 
understood in relation to its environment, in terms of system 
input and output. First, we define the system that we are 
considering, the object system. It is important to clarify the 
boundaries of the object system, since the subsequent 
discussion of the security model is based upon a well-
defined system. The object system may be arbitrarily 
complex: a single computer, a computer network or possibly 
a whole organisation, including people. Note that by 
studying a larger system more of the potential problems are 
“embedded” into the system as internal or insider problems. 
These problems are not directly addressed in the paper. The 
object system interacts with the environment in two 
basically different ways. The object system either receives 
an input from the environment, or delivers an output to the 
environment; see Figure 1. The input to the system is 
denoted environmental influence. The environmental 
influence may be of many different kinds. The type of 
interaction we are interested in here is that which involves 
fault introduction. Malicious, external faults, i.e., attacks, 
are particularly interesting. Such faults originate from a 
threat (or threat agent) in the environment. The threat may 
be a human being, a natural phenomenon or another 
computer system, among other things. The threat agent 
launches an attack towards the system. The attack will be 
successful if it can exploit a vulnerability in the system so 
that an intrusion results. The result of the intrusion can be 
regarded as an error (or erroneous state) in the system. Note 
that a vulnerability is a passive feature of the system as 
opposed to an error. The error may (or may not) propagate 
and lead to a system failure. This depends on the 
implementation of the system, how it is operated, what 
defensive mechanisms are active etc. Thus, there is a causal 
relationship between those impairments: fault/attack, 
error/intrusion and failure. Further details on impairments 
and their interaction can be found in [2, 14]. 
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B. Defining the system attributes 
We will now discuss the relation between these 
impairments and security aspects. Since faults are 
detrimental to the system, we seek to design the system such 
that the introduction of faults is prevented. (This is marked 
as a bold “stop-bar” in Figure 1.) We denote this ability 
integrity. It is thus a protective attribute of security. The 
conceptual output from the object system is the system 
behaviour. The system behaviour includes the notion of the 
degree of service delivery to the authorized user of the 
system, in the following denoted USER, and to the non-
authorized user, denoted NON-USER.  
Thus, the required system behaviour is different for 
USERs and NON-USERs. The desired service delivery to 
the USER is described by the availability and reliability 
attribute. The other desired quality is that the system shall 
have an ability to deny service, denoted denial-of-service, to 
the NON-USER. (Marked by a “stop-bar”.) Note the duality 
of these concepts. The normal and preferred situation with 
respect to the USER, i.e., that the service is indeed 
delivered, implies a failure with respect to the NON-USER 
and vice versa. If the service denied relates to information it 
is described by the behavioural attribute confidentiality. In 
case it relates to other services, we use the word exclusivity 
[18]. Thus, exclusivity is the ability of the system to deny 
unauthorized use of system service. 
Finally, the safety attribute introduces another aspect of 
system behaviour. It models the severity of a failure in the 
sense that it maps failures into catastrophic and non-
catastrophic failures. All failures that are regarded as 
catastrophic, whether they represent a failure of service 
delivery or a failure of denial-of-service, are represented by 
the safety attribute. Thus, safety failures represent subsets of 
reliability/availability failures or confidentiality/exclusivity 
failures. An example of a “catastrophic failure” is a failure 
in the drive-by-wire system of a car that would lead to an 
accident, with possible casualties. Another example is the 
unauthorized disclosure of secret, military information that 
would have disastrous consequences in case of war. 
The maintainability attribute has no place in our model, 
as it does not describe an operational system-environmental 
interaction. Maintainability rather represents the efficiency 
of the implementation of a security mechanism that is aimed 
at making the system security design better (more secure, 
reliable, safe, etc).  
C. A limitation: The binary assumption for impairments 
It must be noted that throughout this paper we have 
implicitly applied a binary model of our impairments. For 
example, we have assumed that the system is functioning or 
non-functioning, i.e., that there is a failure or there is no 
failure. Is is obvious that in many cases this is an over-
simplification. In reality, the system will not fail completely, 
but only to a certain degree. It may continue to work, but 
with degraded service delivery or degraded performance. 
This aspect is encompassed by the attribute performability. 
See [34] and references therein.  
There have been a few studies on behavioural metrics 
considering the degradation approach. In [12], a practical 
dependability metric for degradable computer systems with 
non-exponential degradation was proposed. The 
dependability attributes covered by this approach were: 
reliability, safety and performability. Markov modelling 
with phase-type assumption to enhance assessment of 
systems with non-exponential and time-dependent 
degradation was used. These types of studies have a good 
potential of being applied in behavioural security 
metrication. 
We have also used the binary assumption on the input 
side in that we say that there is an intrusion or there is no 
intrusion. This assumption is also a significant 
simplification. We all know that intrusions are in many 
cases something that happens gradually, maybe starting with 
a session of port-scanning and continuing with increasing 
degrees of penetration. Thus, it may not be evident exactly 
when it happens. Further, an intrusion is not always a single 
event, but the combined effect of two or several events that 
cooperate.  
IV. IMPLICATIONS  OF THE MODEL 
A. The causality perspective 
A benefit of the model is that it clearly exhibits the 
causal chain of impairments, from attack to system failure. 
The attack is launched by a threat agent. If successful, there 
is an intrusion, which produces an unwanted system state, 
i.e., an error. There are three different outcomes of the 
system error. First, it may be immediately removed by some 
recovery mechanism. Second, it may be latent in the system 
for some time, before it propagates to the output. The 
latency time may be short. It may also last for very long 
time periods, e.g., many years, whether for operational 
reasons or because this was the intention of the attacker [1]. 
Third, the error may propagate through the system without 
any noticeable delay and directly cause a system failure. 
The above reasoning shows how an attack may cause an 
error that propagates to cause a failure. On the other hand, it 
also shows that a successful attack may cause an error but 
that this error will not lead to a failure, i.e., it will not affect 
the system service. Therefore, insufficient integrity could 
lead to a behavioural failure, whether reflected in reduced 
reliability, availability, safety or confidentiality. Thus, the 
service delivered may be impaired by attacks on the system, 
but the relation between the attacks and the service is 
complicated and dependent on system internal factors 
among other things. 
In another situation, the service delivered by the system 
may fail as a result of some (apparently) random error 
within the system, e.g., a component failure. 
In summary, a system failure may be caused by an 
attack, but may also be due to some random event. Or, 
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taking the opposite view, a successful attack may or may not 
lead to a failure. If it leads to a failure, there may be 
considerable delay between the attack and the resulting 
failure.  
B. Three basic methods to avoid failures (“defence lines”) 
Considering the above causal relation between 
impairments, we can see that there are three basic ways to 
break the causal chain of unwanted events and to counter 
the propagation of impairments; see Figure 1. The basic 
causal chain is attack - error - failure. We observe that the 
attack, i.e., external fault, originates from the environmental 
threat. The error is the result of insufficient protection 
against the attack. Finally, the failure occurs since the error 
was permitted to propagate to the system output. The 
obvious conclusion is that defence methods could be applied 
accordingly. We name them threat reduction, boundary 
protection and recovery. Threat reduction methods focus on 
the threat. These methods aim to reduce or eliminate the 
threat, i.e., make it less probable that an attack is launched 
towards the system. An example of threat reduction would 
be legal measures. If the threat agent is a human attacker the 
prospect of facing a jail sentence would most probably 
decrease her motivation to launch attacks as compared to if 
the act was legal. 
Boundary protection is the set of methods that protect 
the system from malicious external influence. An example 
would be authentication, which aims at refusing access for 
unauthorized entities. 
Recovery methods aim at eliminating errors inside 
system boundaries before they produce a failure. For 
internal faults this is the only available defence 
methodology. An anti-virus tool is an obvious example of a 
recovery mechanism. A virus that has entered the system 
represents an error. It is well known that many viruses will 
not become visible to the USER until at some later occasion. 
If they can be found and deleted before they have caused a 
failure, a successful recovery has taken place. 
In order to counter an attack, i.e., to avoid a system 
failure, only one of these methods needs to be effective. On 
the other hand careful security work requires that all three 
types of methods are used and are continuously active.  
V. SECURITY METRICS BASED ON THE SYSTEM MODEL 
A. Previous Research on  Security Metrication  
There have been several previous attempts to present 
various frameworks and directions in the security 
metrication research field. The first comprehensive attempt 
towards structuring the security measurement and 
metrication research was carried out at the WIISSR 
workshop [27]. A generic concept for Information-   
Security *, denoted (IS)* was defined in the workshop to 
avoid confusion in terminology. IS* was intended to cover  
all different terms in the area, e.g., metric, measure, score, 
rating, rank, or assessment result. A significant outcome of 
the workshop was its proposal for the three main tracks for 
security metrication, i.e., Technical, Organizational and 
Operational metrics. Following this proposal, other 
researchers tried to add more categories with respect to 
various metrication applications, objectives and goals. 
Vaughn et al. [17] proposed two main categories for 
Information Assurance measurement: Technical Target of 
Assessment and Organizational security. From the 
Organizational perspective, NIST 800-26 [21] and Savola 
[3] proposed three main tracks for security metrication: 
Technical, Operational and Management. NIST 800-55 [19, 
20] offered another categorization for metrication 
suggesting Implementation, Effectiveness and Efficiency as 
well as Business Impact as the main metrication categories. 
Other well-known security metrics approaches have been 
suggested by Savola [4], Pironti [7], CISWG [10] and 
NISTIR 7564 [22], ISO/IEC 27004 [26] and Payne [30], 
each of them for different systems and applications. There 
have not been many attempts to model-based security 
metrication. However, Savola [5] proposed a Security 
Metrics Objective Segment model, which is a taxonomy 
model including five levels for the main security metrics 
objective segments. 
B. Different Approaches to the Security Metrication 
Process 
The process to find a metric for a concept such as 
security involves several steps. First, you must define the 
concept that you intend to metricate, i.e., you make a model 
of it. Second, you must decide which logical attributes of 
the model that could serve as carriers for the metric that you 
are interested of. Third, you must select a suitable method 
for assessing the “magnitude” of these attributes. Such a 
method could very often be based on some tangible feature 
of the system, such as a protection mechanism or a 
vulnerability. Finally, you must find a way to carry out the 
metrication in a practical way. Practical ways may involve 
data gathering, electrical measurement or inquiries.  
The discussion in this paper mainly covers the two first 
steps above. However, for the integrity attribute we also 
have suggestion for the following steps. 
C. Metrication of Security and Dependability Based on 
Protective and Behavioural Attributes 
In our approach, metrication is based on the attributes 
defined in the system model  presented in section III. The 
attributes suitable for metrication are those defined 
according to the suggested two types of system-environment 
interaction, i.e., input from the environment and output to 
the environment. Thus, it should be possible to define 
protective metrics and behavioural metrics, related to the 
system input and output respectively.  
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D. Protective  Security Metrics 
1) Protective security is integrity  
Protective metrics should assess the extent to which the 
system is able to protect itself against unwanted external 
influence, e.g., external attacks. Normally, we assume that 
there is some kind of malicious intent involved in this 
influence, but you could also think of situations when the 
unwanted input is the result of e.g., a mistake made by an 
“ordinary” user. According to our system model, it is the 
integrity attribute, that embodies (protective) security and in 
our opinion it is the integrity attribute that captures the 
essence of security.  
2) Protective metrics based on protection mechanisms  
There may be several ways to measure the protective 
ability. One way could be based upon the strength of the 
(protective) security mechanisms of the system, under the 
assumption that the stronger the mechanisms are, the better 
the system is protected. In this situation, the measure would 
be based on the combined strength of all involved security 
mechanisms. For example, the ISO 27004 standard assesses 
the effectiveness of the implemented information security 
controls [26]. The problem with this approach is that the 
security (i.e., integrity) will not necessarily be higher if 
stronger mechanisms are involved. This is due to the fact 
that the protective strength rather lies in the fact that there 
are no weak mechanisms. Or in other words, there should be 
no vulnerabilities or “holes” in the system. However, it is a 
non-trivial task to find a method for such a combination of 
the effect of a number of protective mechanisms.  
A similar approach is to base the metric on the three 
fundamental defence methods (“defence lines”) described in 
IV.B: threat reduction, boundary protection and recovery. 
We realize that there are available mechanisms for the 
defence against intrusions for each of these methods and in 
this case the metric would assess the combined strength of 
the corresponding mechanisms.  
3) Using attacker effort as a protective security metric 
Another way could be to base the metric upon the effort 
that has to be expended by an attacker in order to make a 
breach into the system (i.e., compromise integrity). This 
idea was first proposed by Littlewood et al. [35] and their 
work has been extended in [16, 23, 36]. The idea is that an 
effort-based metric should be representative of all 
environment factors having effect on the attacker’s ability to 
make a successful intrusion. The main contributing factors 
of effort are the time it takes to carry out the attack and the 
skill level of the attacker. However, many other parameters 
have to be considered: population of attackers, attack space 
size, reward effect on attackers’ behaviour, system feedback 
to the attacker, attackers’ willingness, etc.  
4) How to find an effort  metric in practice 
In the above section, we discussed which environmental 
parameters that an effort metric should reflect and in 
particular the attacker behaviour. However, it is probably 
infeasible to really measure all those parameters in practice. 
Instead we have to rely upon representative samples. An 
attempt to make a real measurement by performing 
supervised attack experiments was reported in [16, 28]. This 
work showed that it is in principle possible to find a metric 
for effort. In this simplified case, the metric was Mean Time 
To Intrusion (MTTI), or Mean Time To Compromise, i.e., 
the average time used by an attacker to make an intrusion. It 
was also shown that, given certain pre-conditions the MTTI 
metric could be combined with a MTTF metric derived from 
random errors, such as component errors. However, the 
practical metric from such a single experiment has limited 
applicability and does only reflect the security of the used 
system at the time of measurement. It remains to be 
demonstrated how to make measurements that are generally 
applicable and could serve to make predictions of the 
security of other similar systems.   
E. Behavioural Security Metrics 
As suggested by the model, the behavioural security 
attributes (or more accurately: security and dependability 
related attributes) are: reliability, availability, safety, 
confidentiality and exclusivity. There are already a large 
number of metrics suggested for reliability, availability and 
safety and they could readily be incorporated into the 
framework. Confidentiality and exclusivity metrics are less 
well investigated. Below we shortly describe existing or 
proposed metrics for behavioural security attributes.  
Reliability is the expected time duration the system is 
operating  before it fails in delivering its service. The 
common metric for this is Mean-Time-to-Failure (MTTF).  
Availability measures to which degree, often expressed in 
percent, the system is capable of delivering its service taken 
into account the alternation of service delivery and non-
delivery [22].  
Safety evaluates the absence of catastrophic consequences 
on the USERs and the environment in case of a failure [22]. 
A common metric for safety is Mean Time to Catastrophic 
Failure (MTTCF) and it is defined in analogy with Mean 
Time To Failure.  
Confidentiality  quantifies the ability of the system to keep 
sensitive information confidential with respect to NON-
USERs.  
One of the approaches to confidentiality metrication is to 
derive behavioural measures from traditional reliability 
methods, such as Markov modelling. Jonsson et al. [13] 
proposed performance measures on user-specified service 
levels. They discussed that certain levels could be related to 
confidentiality degradation or confidentiality failures. 
Hence, Mean Time To Degradation was suggested both as a 
reliability metric (w.r.t the USERs) and a confidentiality 
metric (w.r.t. NON-USERs). We proposed a vectorized 
measure reflecting the status of the service levels defined for 
the system. Other approaches to confidentiality metrication 
are found in [38, 24]. 
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The concept of exclusivity is not widely used and we 
know of no suggestions for how to measure it. However, it 
seems plausible that an approach similar to that of 
confidentiality could be adopted.  
VI. THE RELATION BETWEEN PROTECTIVE AND 
BEHAVIOURAL METRICS 
A. Implication of the chain of impairments on behavioural 
metrics 
In “The causality perspective”, Section (IV.A), we 
identified a causal chain of impairments from the attack 
phase to the system failure. In this section, we discuss the 
effect of the chain of impairments in security metrication.  
We realize that the behavioural attributes of the system 
are dependent upon the environmental threats, protection 
mechanisms and the internal recovery mechanisms. The 
stronger a threat reduction mechanism is, the less becomes 
the threat towards the system and consequently the number 
and/or strength of potential attacks. Further, the better a 
boundary protection mechanism is, and the higher the 
integrity is, the lesser would the number of errors in the 
system be. Finally, the better a recovery mechanism is, the 
less probable is a system failure. As a conclusion, the 
behavioural attributes (and metrics), depend on the strength 
of the three defence lines in the system in such a way that a 
better defence will lead to increased reliability. Thus, the 
better the defence mechanisms are, the higher becomes the 
reliability of the system. In conclusion, higher integrity will 
lead to higher reliability and the integrity metric will 
potentially affect the reliability metric as well as metrics for 
all other behavioural attributes.   
B. Implications of latency on behavioural metrics 
In the preceding section, we noted that there is a 
coupling between protective and behavioural attributes 
(mechanisms, metrics). In this section, we will deal with the 
latency aspect. Error latency is the delay between the 
introduction of an error into the system, as a consequence of 
an intrusion, and the resulting failure. The latency is mainly 
a function of system operation and/or of recovery 
mechanisms. The latency may be short or long. In the case 
of infinite latency there will be no failure and the system 
behaviour will never be affected. Now, by applying the 
same reasoning as in the previous section we realize that 
latency will also affect behavioural attributes and metrics. 
The longer the error latency, the better is the system 
behaviour, i.e., the better the reliability, etc. The conclusion 
of this is that integrity “failures” are related to behavioural 
failures, but that there is no deterministic correspondence.  
VII. DISCUSSION 
It is well known that security is a multi-faceted and 
complex concept. Further, there are several definitions of 
security, in the sense of which attributes should be included, 
on top of the traditional “CIA” ones. Some of these 
attributes may also be in contradiction to each other, for 
example integrity vs availability. Despite these facts many 
(if not most) authors suggest metrics for security without 
making a proper definition of it. We believe that the 
advantage of our approach is that it suggests a model of the 
integrated security-dependability meta-concept, in which it 
is split into a number of attributes. Our message is that 
metrication must focus on these attributes and that 
metrication of the meta-concept is not feasible or even 
possible. Thus, we have defined these attributes and the 
relation between them. There are several advantages with 
this approach: 1) It clarifies the relation between security 
“failures” and system (behvioural) failures. A security 
failure does not necessarily affect the service delivered. If it 
does indeed lead to a failure, this may take considerable 
time.  2) It becomes clear how preventive and protective 
actions, as well as recovery, may have beneficial 
consequences on the behavioural attributes. 3) The 
distinction between safety and security (integrity), which is 
sometimes an issue of controversy, becomes well defined. 
And in all of the three cases mentioned above there is an 
implication for the related metrics. For example, it clarifies 
why increased security leads to better safety. This is 
typically applicable for the “connected car”, i.e., for 
virtually all modern cars. Another example, which shows 
that the model is very general can be taken from social 
sciences: by addressing problems with young people in 
metropolitan problem areas, we can mitigate criminality and 
its consequences many years later.  
VIII. CONCLUSION 
We have described an approach for the meta-concept of 
security and dependability. The approach is based on a 
system model that re-groups its attributes into protective 
(“input”) and behavioural (“output”) ones. We have outlined 
how metrics could be defined in accordance: protective 
metrics and behavioural metrics. There are already some 
metrics for behavioural attributes, but less so for the 
protective attribute, integrity. We have argued that the 
integrity attribute captures the essence of security and could 
indeed serve as a definition of security, in a restricted sense. 
We have outlined two methods for metricating security and 
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